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CASE COMMENTS
CARnIERS-ARxRERS HAD DUTY TO ASSIST PASSENGER TO ALIGHTTRAN'mN NoT REQUIRED TO ASSIST PASSENGERS OFF AND ON TRAINS, UN-

LESS INFIRmITY OBvious OR REQUEST MADE THEREFon.-Appellee was passenger on appellant's train. When she arrived shortly after midnight
at her destination, a flag station at which no depot was maintained, the
train did not stop at the usual platform but ran some 200 or 300 yards
beyond before stopping. She started through the car to alight from
the front end as she was accustomed to do, but she was directed by the
conductor to alight from the back platform. She called his attention
to the fact that there was no light for her to see by or any stool for
her to step off on, but he paid no attention to her, she then stepped
from the train and fell down a steep incline and so injured herself that
soon afterwards she suffered a miscarriage. Held, that under these
circumstances the appellants owed her the duty of assistance in alighting. L. & X. By. Co. v. Scarbrough, 208 Ky. 79, 270 S. W. 494.
Another case similar in facts is that of L. & X. B. R. Co. v. Bownman,
208 Ky. 39, in which the appellee claimed that she was injured in boarding a passenger train at a regular station on the appellant's road. The
appellee had several packages in her hand. The train stopped beyond
the platform and the lowest step was two, or tliree feet from the ground.
She laid the packages on the step of the coach and attempted to mount
the steps but was only able to touch the step with one toe. She pulled
herself up but in doing so her foot slipped and she fell, scraping one
shin and bruising her other limb. The brakeman was standing near,
and she turned to him after she had fallen and told him that she did
not believe that she could get up, but he only smiled and never offered
to assist her in any way. She succeeded in getting up and got on the
train without any aid. Upon arriving at her home she was confined
for about a week because of her injuries which resulted in a miscarri.
age. It was held that the appellant owed her the duty to assist her in
boarding the train upon her asking for aid. These two leading cases
are decided upon practically the same points. However, the latter case
seems to affirm the doctrine that the trainmen are not required to assist passengers off and on the trains, unless infirmity is obvious, or
request is made therefor. The former case holds this to be unnecessary.
The rules governing cases involving this question are applicable
to both railroads and street railways; the courts apparently make no
distinction. The rule was applied to the street railway in the case of
Bweet v. Louisville Ry. Co., 113 Ky. 15, and also in C., X. 0. & T. P.
v. Bell, 25 Ky. 10. It was held in the latter case that the same duty
of safety was owed to negroes as is owed to white people.
Most courts hold that ordinarily, under normal conditions the carrier is under no duty to assist passengers in boarding and alighting
from trains, i. e., it is not their duty unless they are aware of infirmity
or that assistance is needed or that ingress'and egress is in any way
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difficult. It was so held in Deskins v. Chicago R. 1. & P. R. Co., 151
Mo. App. 432, 132 S. W. 45, that the railway company was not negligent
In that its trainmen failed to assist the plaintiff, a young woman in
vigorous health, when she did not ask for assistance and it did not appear that she needed any. This same rule was followed in YarneU v.
Kansas City, Ft. Worth & M. R. R. Co., 113 Mo. 570, 21 S. W. 1.
It Is not incumbent on the employes of a railroad company to be
on the lookout to discover that any particular passenger needs special
attention; but if a passenger is in need of special attention and this
fact is known to the employes it is their duty to render it, but they are
not required to anticipate such wants or needs. I. C. Ry. Co. V. Cruse,
23 Ky. 463. If a female passenger is accompanied by an escort to whom
she is actually or apparently looking for protection and assistance, an
employee is under no duty to assist her unless requested to do so. L.
& N. R. B. v. Dyer, 152 Ky. 264; Arnett v. C. & 0. R. B. Co., 198 Ky.
491.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi sets forth a stricter rule
perhaps than other courts in saying "railway cars are not traveling
hospitals nor their employes nurses, and although sick people and invalids are allowed on the train they cannot expect to be nursed by the
employes and the assistance rendered by them is purely a matter of
courtesy; and not at all incumbent upon them in line of their public
duty." New Orleans, etc., B. R. Co. v. Stathem, 97 Am. Dec. 478.
The court in deciding the present case has clearly followed the
majority rule.
M. W. M.
MASTER AND SERVANT-COMPENSATION FOR INJURY CREDITED ON SERV-

PEwsoN.-An employee working under
the Workmen's Compensation Act was injured by the negligent act of
a third person. He obtained compensation from his employer; then
recovered judgment against the third person. Held that the third person was entitled to have this judgment against him diminished to the
extent of the amount of the previous compensation award, in view of
Kentucky Statutes, section 4890. Williams v. Brown, 205 Ky. 74, 265
S. W. 480.
Section 4890, Kentucky Statutes, provides that "the injured em.
ployee may at his option either claim compensation or proceed at law
by civil action against such other person to recover damages, or proceed both against the employer for compensation and such other person
to recover damages, but he shall not collect from both." The limitation, that "he shall not collect from both" is the phrase calling for construction. Does it mean only that the employee may not collect double
damages, or does it mean that when he collects from one he waives his
right to proceed against the other?
TIhe leading case in Kentucky on the question, is Book v. Hender.
von, 176 Ky. 785, 197 S. W. 449, in which it was held that the employee
might proceed against the third person after he had received compenANT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST THIRD
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sation from his employer, but that to the extent he collected from the
employer he could not collect from the third person. The statutes of
other states contain differing provisions as to the employee's right, but
where the statute gives a right to proceed against both employer and
the negligent third person, it is generally held that the limitation is
only on the right to collect double damages. Houlihan v. Sulzberger
& Sons Co., 118 N. E. 429.
,The common law rule is that although judgment and satisfaction
is a bar to another action for the same injury, judgment without satisfaction, or judgment with only part satisfaction is not a bar. City of
Louisville v. Nicholls, 158 Ky. 516, 165 S. W. 660; Lovejoy v. Murray,
3 Wall. 1; Marsh v. Berry, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 344. Where plaintiff recovers
part satisfaction, the only limitation on his right against the other
wrongdoer is that to the extent he recovered from the first, he cannot
recover from the second. United Society of Shakers v. Underwood, 74
Ky. (11 Bush) 265. In City of Covington v. Westbay, 156 Ky. 839, 162
S. W. 91, the court held that the acceptance by one who has a cause of
action against two joint tort feasors of a sum of money from one of
them In part satisfaction of his cause of action does not release the
other. The only distinction to be made is that in the present case, the
employer is not a wrongdoer, but his liability is. fixed by statute regardless of blame.
Giving a reason for construing the phrase above mentioned to be
a limitation only on the right to collect double damages, the court in
Book v. Henderson, supra, said it did not seem reasonable to believe
that -the legislature meant that the employee must forego the acceptance of small weekly benefits awarded against the employer, and get
nothing until the end of litigation with the negligent third party, which
might be protracted. Both reason and authority sustain the decision
that the employee may proceed against the negligent third person after
he has received compensation from the employer, but to the extent he
recovers from one he cannot recover from the other.
L. H. S.

CRnAr. LAw-CoURTS wim NOT DEc.DE ABsTsAcT Pnoposrroxs on
MOOT CAEss.i-The defendant was sentenced to serve sixty days in jail
for having liquor in his possession. He obtained a pardon from the
governor, but it was later revoked by that office and declared to be
void by the court that tried him. He was committed to jail and served
his sentence. Now he appeals from the judgment of the court below
which declared the pardon to be void. The court is asked to decide a
question as to the validity of a pardon when the sentence for which
the pardon was granted has already been served. Held: It being patent
that a determination of the question presented by the appeal would be
wholly ineffectual to afford appellant any relief, the appeal is dismissed.
Hudspeth v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 606, 265 S. W. 15.
Appellate courts do not sit to give opinions on moot questions or
abstract propositions. Mis v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, 40 L. Ed. 293 When
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pending an appeal, the circumstances change to such an extent that the
appeal involves merely a moot question, it will be dismissed. Tabor v.
Hipp, 136 Ga. 123, 70 S. E. 886.
Jf during the time an appeal is pending an event occurs which
makes a determination of it unnecessary or renders it clearly impossible for the appellate court to grant effectual relief, the court will dismiss the appeal. Farquarson v. State, 26 Okl. 767, 110 Pac. 909. This
case was an appeal from a decree granting a mandamus directing the
mayor of a city to call an election. The time for holding the election
had elapsed and the election had been called and held. The court said:
"This proceeding now presents nothing but hypothetical questions for
the determination of the court. Since the time for holding the election
expired, and the election has been held, any decision which the
court might reach upon the question submitted to it by the appeal
would afford no actual relief, or be followed by any practical results.
The appeal should be dismissed, and it is so ordered." This doctrine
Is followed in the following cases: State v. Fields, 53 Or. 453, 101 Pac.
218; McAdam v. People, 179 Ill. 316, 53 N. E. 1102; Paflhausen v. State,
94 Miss. 103, 47 S. 897; Ames v. Williams, 73 Miss. 772, 19 S. 673; state
v. Armstrong, 94 Neb. 592, 143 N. W. 931; Berks County v. Jones, 21
Pa. 413.
In Kentucky this rule is followed in an unbroken line of decisions.
In Searcy v. Fayette Rome Telephone Co., 143 Ky. 811, 137 S. W. 777,
an action was brought to enjoin a municipality from enforcing a contract for telephone service. The term of the contract had expired before the appeal was brought, and the court dismissed the appeal because it presented only a moot question. Courts are created for the
purpose of trying cases rather than questions. 31 Ky. Law Rep. 39.
This doctrine is followed in Benton v. Clay, 192 Ky. 497, 233 S. W. 104;
Williams v. Howard, 193 Ky. 843, 237 S. W. 1062; Logan County Fiscal
Court v. Childress, 196 Ky. 1, 243 S. W. 1038. The same principle is
recognized in section 343 of the Kentucky Criminal Code, which provides that: "No appeal shall be taken after the defendant's death, and
upon his death an appeal taken during his life shall abate and shall
not be revived."
The United States Supreme Court follows the same rule as the
state courts. Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651. In this case the object of
the appeal was to secure the right to vote at an election for delegates
to a constitutional convention. Before -the appeal was heard the. day
to vote had passed and the convention had assembled. The court dismissed the appeal because an event had occurred while the appeal was
pending which made it impossible for the court to grant any effectual
relief. Washington Market Co. v. District of Columbia, 137 U. S. 62;
Elwell v. Fosdick, 134 U. S. 500; San Mateo v. Southern P. R. Co., 116
U. S. 138.
The case under consideration is right both on principle and authority. It follows the decisions of the courts of this state, those of the
W. D. S.
courts of the other states, and of the U. S. Supreme Court.
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PROPERTY-COVENANTS-BROEN

COVENANT DOES

NoT PASS

WITH

Trmu-Appellant's predecessor in title sold and conveyed certain rightof-way to appellee's predecessor in title, and by a written agreement,
entirely separate from the deed of conveyance, it was stipulated that
the latter should maintain certain farm crossings for the benefit of the
grantor. The crossings were constructed and were in use at the time
appellee purchased the railway property. Later appellee purchased
an additional right-of-way from appellant's immediate predecessor in
title along that part of its railroad tracks across which one of the
crossings was located; the deed of conveyance being unconstitutional
and containing no reservation to the grantor for the farm crossing
in question. In the reconstruction of appellee's road at that place,
the farm crossing which had previously existed was discontinued. Appellant, present owner of the farm from which the right-of-way was
sold, sues in equity to compel re-establishment of the crossing or for
settlement in damages. Petition dismissed, the court holding that when
a covenant is broken it becomes a chose in action, and does not pass
with a transfer of title, except by express agreement. Witt, et aL v.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, 208 Ky. 2, 270 S. W. 732.
Appellants contend that the railroad's obligation under the agreement became appurtenant to and ran with the title of the land. The
argument is not complete. In this case the covenant was broken before a transfer of title, and the question arises-does a broken covenant
pass to subsequent transferees to the title?
An unbroken covenant passes to subsequent transferees to the title.
Richard v. Brent, 59 Ill. 38, 14 Am. R. 1; Lot v. Parrish,1 Litt. (Ky.)
393; Norman v. Wells, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 136. Covenants which are
connected with the estate run with the land and vest with an assignee.
Butler v. Barnes, 60 Conn. 170, 21 Atl. 419 Wiggins v. Pender, 132 N.
C. 628, 44 S. E. 362; St. Clair v. Williams, 7 Ohio St. 110, 30 Am. Dec.
194. Covenants which run with the land pass with the title without
any warranty from the immediate grantor. Peters v. Bowman, 98 U.
,S. 56, 25 Law Ed. 91;Thomas v. Bland, 91 Ky. 1, 14 S. W. 955. But a
covenant which has been broken ceases to run with the land, and a
right of action for the breach does not pass with the transfer of the title.
DeLong v. Spring Lake Beach lmpr. Co., 74 N. 3. L. 250, 66 Atl 591;
McConaughey v. Bennett, 50 W. Va., 172, 40 S. E. 540. The assignee
of a real covenant cannot maintain an action for a breach which accrued before the assignment, for the breach is a mere chose in action
not running with the land. South v. Hoy, 3 T. B. M. (Ky.) 88; Simonds
v. Diamond Match Co., 159 Mich. 241, 123 N. W. 1132; Smith v. Richards, 155 Mass. 79, 28 N. E. 1132; Kuntzman v. Smith, 77 N. J. Eq. 30,
75 Atl. 1009. The instant a breach of covenant of warranty occurs, a
chose in action arises in favor of the owner of the fee, and who is in
privity with the covenator, and this chose in action is not transferred
or assigned merely by virtue of a deed of covenant. Peden v. Chicago,
ela., By. Co., 73 Ia. 328, 35 N. W. 424; Beecher v. Tinnin, 189 P. 44;
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Merchants Vatl. Bank of Clinton, Ia. v. Otero, 175 P. 781; McG-urn v.
L. d N. Railroad Co., 177 Ky. 835, 198 S. W. 222. A right of action on
a broken covenant does not pass to subsequent transferees with the
title only by express assignment. Eli v. Trent, et al., 195 Ky. 26, 241
S. W. 324; Cincinnati Southern Railway Co. v. Hudson, 88 Ky. 480, 11
S. W. 509; Payne,Agt. v. Smith, 198 Ky. 564, 249 S. W. 995; Davenport
v. Davenport, 52 Mich. 587, 18 N. W. 371.
The above case was decided with the great weight of authority.
W. F. S.
INN:KEEPEBS-O-E HELD "GuEST" AND NOT BoARDEn SO AS TO IMPOSE
CommoN-LAw OBLIGATION OF INN KEPER FOR Loss OF AuTomoBno.-Plaintiff's agent went to defendant's hotel and contracted with him for a
month's board for him and his wife and also made arrangements to
store plaintiff's car, which he was using, in defendant's garage
which was used for the purpose of storing patron's cars. The plaintiff's
car was stolen from the garage and he sued for the loss of the car. The
lowet court relfeved defendant of liability if the loss of the automobile
was the result of the failure of the plaintiff's agent to exercise ordinary
care to protect and preserve it i. e., it gave ordinary instruction
on contributory negligence. On appeal it was held that the court erred.
As there was no proof of contributory negligence on part of the plaintiff's agent, and as the defendant had control over the car at the time
it was taken and failed to exercise proper care to guard it, the plaintiff can recover. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Altamont Springs
Hotel Co., 206 Ky. 494, 267 S. W. 555.
With regard to the nature and extent of an innkeeper's liability
for loss of, or damage to the goods of a guest, there are two distinct
doctrines, each supported by well considered adjudicated cases as well
as by text writers. According to the rule supported by many decisions
he is practically an insurer as to the goods of the guest, and is excused
from liability only when injury results from the act of God or is
caused by the public enemy, or by the fault, direct or implied, of the
guest himself. Glenn v. Jackson, 93 Ala. 342, 9 So. 259.
This Ifsthe common law rule and the doctrine is upheld in the
courts of the various states. "The innkeeper is bound for the safe
keeping of the beasts of the guests, and his goods, that is, his luggage,
anppaxel, money, etc., and if any of them are stolen or lost while the
relation of host and guest continues, he must make good such loss or
damage. He is, like the common carrier, an insurer of the goods of
his guests and nothing short of inevitable accident, casualty of war or
the fault of the guest himself can excuse him for their loss. Russell
v. Pagan (Del), 8 Atl. 258. This doctrine is also affirmed in Schultz
v. Wall, 134 Pa. 262, 19 AtI. 742; Coskery v. Nagle (Ga.) 83 Ga. 696,
10 S. E. 491; Moore v. Long Beach Development Co. (Cal.) 87 Cal. 483,
26 P. 92. (1891).

L. J.-5
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However, when the patron ceases to be a guest or never becomes
such, but sustains toward his host at the time of the loss for which
liability is sought to be fixed, only the relationship of "boarder," then
the duties of his entertainer are reduced from that of an innkeeper to
that of a bailee for hire, who is to exercise only ordinary care for
the safety of the boarder and for the protection of his personal belongIngs, including necessary vehicles and his horses or other animals by
which the vehicles are drawn. Coe v. Rickard, 214 Mass. 212, 101 N.
E. 76, and Taylor v. Downey, 104 Mich. 632, 62 N. W. 716; Fisher v.
Booneville Hotel Co., 55 Utah 588, 188 Pac. 12 A. L. R. 255. The text
authorities referred to, as thoroughly oat in the annotations in 12 A.
L. R. 255, are to the effect that the mere fact that the patron contracts
for a definite period of entertainment at an agreed price does not necessarily convert him from a guest of the innkeeper to a boarder, so as
to reduce the common-law obligations imposed upon his entertainer as
an innkeeper to that of a landlord entertaining a boarder. But the
leading Kentucky cases on this subject, Kisten v. Hildebrand, 14 B.
Mon. 72, Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush 41, and Reed v. Teneyck, 103
Ky. 65, seem to have adopted what might be called the minority rule,
i. e., "If a person comes to the place of entertainment upon a special
contract to board and sojourns at an inn, he is not, in the sense of the
law, a guest, but a boarder," since in this case he did not seek refuge
at the inn as a transient traveler.
This rule being applied in the case at hand, the court in rendering
its decision has clearly followed the doctrine prevailing in this state
M. W. M.
instead of following the general rule.

DnEus-CoNvEYANcE OF FEE Si PLE TITLE TO GRANTEE HAVING DF.AsLE FEE,RELEAsES PossmiLrrY OF RnvxwTEP--Where a grantor in a
deed which conveyed but defeasible fee, and contained provision for
reverter, made subsequent conveyance to same grantee is sufficient
under Kentucky Statutes, section 2343, to carry fee simple title; held,
such second conveyance had effect of releasing to grantees any possibility of reverter, and vesting in them fee simple title though grantor's
possibility of reverter under first deed was not an estate or alienable.
BriU, et al. v. Lynn, et al., 207 Ky. 757.
Although decisions in point with the principle laid down in the
above styled case are few, the courts seem to have a uniform view in
support of the doctrine. Pettit v. Stuttgart Normal Inst., 67 Ark. 430;
Crozier v. Cundall, 99 Ky. 202, and Vaughan v. Langford, 62 S. E. 316,
establish as a legal priciple that a possibility of reverter may be released by the grantor to the holder of the defeasible fee. Section 2343
of the Kentucky Statutes reads as follows: "All estates heretofore and
hereafter created, which, in former times, would have been deemed
estates entailed, shall henceforth be held to be estates in fee simple;
and every limitation on such an estate shall be held valid, if the same
would be valid when limited upon an estate in fee simple." It is al-
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together, as can be clearly seen from even a mere reading of the wording of the statute supra, a matter of construction as to the application
of the principles contained in said statute.
In Wagner v. Waflowa County, 148 Pacific 1140, the Supreme Court
of Oregon holds that when a grantor of land, subject to a defeasance
for condition broken, conveys any interest to a third person before such
breach, he is thereafter estopped to assert a right of entry. The case
of Cincinnativ. Babb, 4 Ohio Decisions,464, casts a little more light on
the subject. A lot was given to a church with a clause of defeasance
and reverter if the land should ever be used for other than church purposes. The city subsequently appropriated a part of it to widen the
street and damages were assessed at $1,000.00. The court, in that case,
held that the church and not the grantor was entitled to the money,
since the performance of the condition being prevented by a subsequent
act the condition, and not the estate, was destroyed.
At common law fee simple titles were so highly regarded that they
were not permitted to be curtailed by a subsequent limiting clause, but
In later years the Kentucky courts, as Well as the higher courts throughout the country, have consistently followed the rule of administering
the intention of the parties as far as possible; and even in the construction of a statute relating to deeds and estates the intention of
the grantor and grantee is ever present in the minds of the courts.
Murphy v. Murphy, 182 Kentucky, 731; Dingo v. Luoken, 142 Kentucky,
958.
And with reference to possibility of reverter we again cite a general rule laid down in Vail v. Long Island R. Co., 106 N. Y. 283. "A
possibility of reverter is, at common law, not an estate; It is Inalienable, not assignable, not devisable unless made so by statute; but It 1
descendable and may be released to him in possession." See Adam v.
Chaplin, 10 S. C. Equity, 265. It has been held that this possibility is
nbt subject to merger by the union of the possibility of reverter with
the fee conditional in the heir at law. The outstanding case on the
questions involved in this point is Vaughan v. Langford, 81 S. C. 282,
62 Southeastern 316'. Kentucky is in accord with these decisions as is
the weight of authority throughout the country. The cases are, however, not ir accord as to whether a possibility of reverter is or is not
I. J. M.
within the rule against perpetuities.
DA AGEs-No RECOVERY FR PHYsICAL INJURIms DUE TO FRIGHT
WITHOUT IMPACT PERMiTED-Plaintiff's husband, an employee of defendant, lived in box cars on defendant's tracks. Plaintiff's husband
"went out" in a nation-wide strike by railway employees Defendant
gave notice to plaintiff and her husband to vacate the cars. At this
time plaintiff was enciente and expected to give birth to a child within
a month. When plaintiff and her husband did not vacate the cars, defendant, without resorting to the proper legal processes to dispossess
them, undertook to accomplish this purpose by moving the cars. De-
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fendant's workmen violently shook and jarred the cars. Plaintiff was
frightened and suffered a miscarriage. Held, the impact and fright
were coincident in point of time, and the railroad was responsible for
the miscarriage as if it had occurred from impact alone, altho miscarriage might not have resulted from impact without fright.
This case involves the application of the principles governing those
cases of injuries that result from fright accompanied and unaccompanied by physical impact. If there is an impact and fright coincident
in point of time, recovery is allowed for the resulting shock and physical injuries whether caused by the concurrence of fright and impact
or by fright alone. McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737, 147 S. W. 742. But
the doctrine which denies recovery for physical injuries due to fright
without impact is well established in America and in this state. Lehmantn v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 47 Hun. (N. Y.) 355. 14 N. Y. St. Rep.
575 (1883); Spade v. Lynn d Boston R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E.
881; Ky. Traction & Terminal Co. v. Bain, 161 Ky. 44, 170 S. W. 449;
McGee v. Vanover, 148 Ky. 737,'147 S. W. 742. In the case of McGee v.
Vanover, a leading case in this jurisdiction on the subject, the two defendants, McGee and Evans, assaulted plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff was enciente. She was frightened by the assault and suffered a
miscarriage. While engaged in the assault the defendant Evans had
pushed the plaintiff aside in order to reach her husband. The court
denied recovery against McGee, as there was no physical contact proved
as to him, but sustained a recovery against Evans which included compensation for the miscarriage. In the recent case of Gardner v. Cumberland Telephone Co. and Western Union Telegraph Co., 207 Ky. 249,
268 S. W. 1108, recovery was not allowed for mental suffering caused
by a death telegram being delivered to the wrong person. This case
also distinguishes the class of cases resting solely on negligence or wilful injury from the class of cases containing an element of contract.
The origin of the doctrine denying recovery for physical injuries
due to fright without impact occurred almost simultaneously in England and America. Victorian R. R. Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 A. C.
222 (1888). This case was based mainly upon the proposition that no
precedents were found to sustain such action. After being questioned
in Pug& v. London R. Co., 2 Q. B. 248 (1896), and Wilkinson v. Dounton, 2 Q. B. 57 (1897), it was finally repudiated in the case of Dulieu
v. White, 2 K. B. 669 (1901), and the doctrine is now well established
in England that there may be recovery for physical injuries resulting
from nervous shock without impact.
The reasons usually assigned for the denial of recovery in this class
of cases are that the damages resulting from the fright are too remote,
and that to open the courts to this character of case would tend to
promote fraud and the presentation of claims for injuries beyond the
capacity of juries properly to assess. The criticism of these reasons
on logical grounds, and the answer to that criticism is probably best
expressed by Justice Holmes in the case of Smith v. Postal Tel. Cable
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(Jo., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N. E. 380, where he said that the refusal to grant
relief in this class of cases "is not put as a logical deduction from the
general principles of liability in tort, but as a limitation of those principles upon purely practical grounds."
;Although by the weight of authority there can be no recovery for
physical injuries'due to fright where there is no physical impact, there
are some cases contra: iAndley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440;
W. D. S.
Watson v. .Dilts,116 Ia. 249, 89 N. W. 1068.
oN Fm Poi.icy wHEaE CHucK
INsunA cE-INsuREn HELD NoT LTA
GIVEN FOn CASH PREMIUM wAS DrsHoNom iThe appellant gave check
as premium on an insurance policy. The check was returned unpaid
from the bank, and the insurance company then 'wrote to appellant,
telling him to return the policy and that the check would then be mailed
to him. .Before. the letter was received, appellant's property was destroyed by fire, and he brought this action to collect the insurance.
Held. that .the -payment -by check was ,cbnditional upon there being
funds In the bank to take care- of It,'and since there wete none, the
policy was 'void. Ratliff, v..St. Paul Fire & Marine'Insurance-7o., 207
Ky.492, 1269 S. W: 546.
This decision is in accord with previous Kentucky decisions. Bailey,
dc. v. Robinson & Co., 14 K. L. R. 670. It is also in accord with the
almost unanimous decisions of other states in holding that the acceptance of a check does not constitute payment. Carroll v. Sweet, 27 N.
E. (N. Y.) 763; Taylor v. Wilson, 11 Met. (Mass.) 44.
But If the check itself is taken as absolute payment, the contract
s complete. Mloore v. Insurance,Co., 107 Ky. 273, 53 9. W. 652; Hunter v. Wetsell, 84 N. Y. 549. The 'dlbtor'is not bound 'if creditor keeps
the check and also insists on payment. Thus, it 'wds held in Walls v.
Ho-me Insurance Co. of New Yo)-k, 114"Ky.-611, 71S.'W. 650, that where
the policy 'provided for paynlent ih'instAlltinents 'afid as to lapse after
an installmefit was due until its payment, the conlpany, by demanding
payment of an installment long after it was due, waived the conditions
providing for lapse.
The basis -of'the decision in the leading case Is that when the check
is dishonored, the consideration for the insurance policy fails, and
hence the policy'is Void. This seems 'a sound basis; and moreover, it
would pave the way for much dishonesty, and b6 very unfair to the
creditor, to allow 'one to binl another to a contract by' giving him a
L. H. S.
worthless check.

MuicwL ConronATioNs-Tn&T Crrv ENeinE= wAs Or~v DE FAcro
OFFICER DID NoT INvALIDATE CoNTAcT.-The Bailey Construction Co.
sued defendant to enforce a lien. for street improvements on abutting
lands owned by defendant in IEarlair, a city.of the fourth class. -The
city has power to make street iipprovements at the expense of the abutting owner by sections 3562 to 3577 of the Kentucky statutes.
ection
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3573 of the Kentucky statutes authorizes the city engineer, at the completion of such work which has been authorized by the city, to make a
correct estimate of the cost of the work, and to apportion it among the
property owners affected. Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot
enforce its lien in this case on the ground that the acting city engineer
at the time of the transaction was serving under an invalid appointment and the contracts were invalid on this account. But plaintiff
admits that the acting city engineer was a de facto officer. Held, even
it being admitted that the acting city engineer was a de facto officer,
the fact that he was serving under an invalid appointment does not affect the validity of the lien. Cornett v. Isafley Construction Company,
203 Ky. 268, 262 S. W. 276.
A de facto officer is one who has the reputation of being the officer
he assumes to be, aid yet is not a good officer in point of law. Petersila
v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465, 20 Am. Rep. 335. The general rule Is that the
acts of a de facto officer are to be upheld as valid so far as they involve
the interest of the public and of third persons. Hussey v. Smith, 99
U. S. 20, 25 Law Ed. 314. The de facto doctrine was introduced into
the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of
the public and individuals, where those interests were involved in the
official acts of persons exercising the duties of an officer, without being
lawful officers. The law validates the acts of de facto officers as to the
public and third persons on the ground that, though not officers de jure,
they are in fact officers whose acts public policy requires should be considered valid. Powers v. Com., 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735, 63 S. W. 796,
53 L. R. A. 245.
The doctrine that the acts of a de facto officer are.valid as to the
public and third parties obtains as a sound rule of law It was upheld
in State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 409. In that case the defendant sought to have his conviction set aside on the ground that the
acting judge of the city court where he was convicted was a de facto
officer, appointed and acting in pursuance of a law which was afterwards judicially declared unconstitutional. But the court affirmed the
judgment of the city court and held that the acts of the de facto officer
were valid. This is a leading case, and is decided on the basis of the
leading English and American cases up to this time. O'Brien v. Knivan,
Cro. Jac. 552; Lord Dacre's Case, 1 Leonard 288; Leak v. HoweNl, Cro.
Eliz, 533; Parker v. Kett, 12 Mod.. 467; Margate Pier v. Hannam, 3 B.
Ald. 266; Fowler v. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231; Parker v. Baker, 8 Paige (N.
Y). 428; Malett v. Uncle Sam Co., 1 Nev. 188; Pea. v. White, 24 Wend.
520; Peo. v. Kane, 23 Id. 414; Carton v. Peo., 10 Mich. 250; Com. v.
McCombs, 56 Penn. St. 439.
The de facto doctrine obtains in this state as well as in England
and in America generally. In Powers v. Cor., 110 Ky. 389, 61 S. W. 735,
53 L. R. A. 245, the court sustained the validity of a pardon granted by
a de facto governor. The legal doctrine as to de facto officers rests upon
the principle of protection to the interests of the public and third
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parties, and not upon the rights of rival claimants. The law validates
the acts of de facto officers as to the public and third persons upon the
ground that, though not officers de jure, they are in fact officers whose
acts public policy requires should be considered valid. Oliver v. The
City of Jersey City, 63 N. J. L. 634, 44 AtL 709, 48 L. R. A. 412; State v.
Poulin,105 Me. 224, 74 Atl. 119, 134 Am. State Rep. 543, 24 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 408; Dabney v. Hudson, 68 Miss. 292, 8 S. 545, 24 Am. State Rep.
276; Powers v. Com., 110 Ky. 386, 61 S. W. 735, 63 S. W. 796, 53 L. IL
A. 245.
The rule as to the validity of the acts of a de facto officer is recognized and applied in the Supreme Court of the United States. In Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S. 445, the court said: "The doctrine which
gives validity to acts of officers de facto, whatever defects there may be
in the legality of their appointment or election, is founded upon considerations of policy and necessity, for the protection of the public and
Individuals whose interests may be affected thereby."
The principal case seems to be right on both principle and authority. It is consistent with the decisions in this and other states, and
is in accord with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Confined as it is to acts involving the interest of the public and third
persons, the rule seems to be sound both on legal and ethical principles.
W. D. S.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION-COMPROMISE
AND SATISFACTION MUST BE EXECUTE,

AN

SETTLTmENTx-AcconD

BUT COMPRO:MSE AND SErTLEM:ENT

NEED NoT BE-An agreement was made between appellant and appellee whereby appellant was to pay appellee and her husband a specified
amount in full settlement and satisfaction of their claim against him
for damages on account of an alleged unskilled dental surgical operation. Held, a valid compromise, which, though executory, was binding
on appellant, and gave right to appellee to sue on the agreement. Barr
v. Gilmour, 204 Ky. 582, 265 S. W. 6.
It Is established by the great weight of authority that an accord
without satisfaction does not constitfite a bar to an action on the original claim or demand. City of Memphis v. Brown, 20 Wall. 289; Manse
v. Hossington, 98 N. E. 203; Prest v. Cole, 67 N. E. 246; Bell v. Pittman,
143 Ky. 521, 136 S. W. 1026. But if the agreement or promise, instead
of the performance thereof, is accepted in satisfaction, the rule is otherwise. Bell v. Pittman, supra. tIn such a case there must, of course,
be a sufficient consideration, as the accord itself is not sufficient. In
Bryant v. Gale, 5 Vt. 420, the court said, "An accord without satisfaction is gio bar, simply because there is no consideration and no mutuality to support it; because the creditor has no means of obtaining satisfaction by enforcing it, and of course derives no satisfaction directly
nor indirectly from it."
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The weight of authority is that the compromise need not be performed; and a compromise is usually distinguished from accord and
satisfaction in that the latter, in order to be a bar, must be executed,
but the former need not be. .Bondman v. Finn, 78 N. E. 175; Flgal v.
Hoover, 156 Pa. 276. But there are some cases which hold that a compromise must be executed; in some of these cases there is an interchangeable use of the terms, "accord and satisfaction," and "compromise and settlement." International Harvester Company of America
v. Merry, 199 Pac. 704. A distinction that is sometimes made is that
while a compromise and settlement may be had only as to a disputed
or unliquidated claim, an accord and satisfaction may be had as to an
undisputed or liquidated claim, if there is sufficient consideration. But
this distinction is of little value, because by the weight of authority,
an accord and satisfaction may be had as to disputed claims. Cunningham v. Standard Construction Co., 134 Ky. 198, 119 S. W. 765.
The compromise of a disputed claim furnishes sufficient consideration, and this compromise is considered as a contract and may be sued
on. Cre-stz v. Heil, 89 Ky. 429, 12 S. W. 926. It seems, therefore, that
on principle, where there has been a valid corpromise agreement, the
rights of the parties shoitid be based on it, as on any other binding
contract. If the compromise is not performed, the party has a remedy
for the failure because he can sue on the agreement. IThe reason why
this principle will not apply in the case of an accord is that there is
no consideration, and it is not regarded as a contract. Where there
is satisfaction to furnish consideration, or an agreement on sufficient
consideration which is taken as satisfaction, the party may sue on the
agreement, and cannot resort to the original claim.
In the present case, the court followed the weight of authority, instead of disregarding the distinction between an accord and satisfaction, and a compromise and settlement, in regard to the necessity for
L. H. S.
performance.
TRUST-DEsIGNATION OF CESTUI QUE TRUST AS SPENDTHRIFT UNNECESSARY To CREATE "SPENDTHRIFT TR=US"-SPENTHIFT TRUST CANNOT BE
TERMINATED AT WIlL OF CESTUi QUE TRUST, ALTHOUGH TRUSTEE CON-

SENTS AND No ONE OBJEcTS.-A testator left his estate to six sons, giv-

ing, however, the moiety of W's to E to be held In trust by E for benefit of W, remainder over to E in default of issue from W. Now, W
being a spender and an improvident son soon tired of this arrangement and petitioned that the will be construed as giving him a fee
and that the estate be paid over to him by the trustee, who had Then
been changed. E answered, and proved that the trust was meant to
be a "spendthrift trust," that W had no occupation except following
racetracks, and that he would squander the estate if it were turned
over to him. Held, a court of equity cannot remake the provisions of a
will creating a trust, however inconvenient it may be to the cestui que
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trust, so long as it is in other respects lawful.
et al. 207 Ky. 355.

Maher, et al. v. Maher,

Was this a spendthrift trust? "'Spendthrift trust'" is a term commonly applied to those trusts that are created with a view of providing
a fund for the maintenance of another and at the same time securing
it against his own improvidence or incapacity, for self-protection.
Wagner v. Wagner, 244 IlL 101. It was a live, active trust. The trustee retained the legal title and paid over the rents and profits to the
cestui que trust. Thus the cestui que trust could not alien or in any
way transfer the property. It comes within the foregoing, commonly
accepted, definition of "spendthrift trust."
The predominant element of a "spendthrift trust" seems to be that
It exempts the fund from the debts accrued by the cestui. Nichols v.
Eaton, 91 U. S. 716; Hyde v. W~oods, 94 U. S. 523; Baker v. Brown, 146
Mass. 369; Slattery v. Mason, 151 Mass. 266; Garland v. Garland, 87
Va. 758. And if the intention to exempt is manifest, liability will not
exist, Wales' Adm'r v. Bowdish's Ex'r, 61 Vt. 23; Baker v. Brown, 146
Mas. 369; Estate ol Stambaugh, 135 Pa. St. 585, and cases cited supra.
The court declared, however, that it is unnecessary to designate the
beneficiary as a spendthrift, or even that the arrangement contain all
the elements of the spendthrift trust. As long as the intention of the
testator appears to create a spendthrift trust, that is enough. The
court will not inquire whether he is a spendthrift
Although the weight of authority upholds this freedom from liability, and considerations of public policy do not speak loudly against it,
this exemption from debt cannot be attached to a "spendthrift trust"
in Kentucky. Section 2355, Carroll's Statutes declares: "Estates of
every kind held or possessed in trust shall be subject to the debts and
charges of the person to whose use and for whose benefit they shall
be respectively held or possessed as they would be subject if those
persons owned the like interest in the property held or possessed as
they own, or shall own, in the use or trust thereof." Wooley v. Preston, 82 Ky. 415; Montgomery v. Offut, 136 Ky. 157; Budd v. Hagan, 86
Ky. 159; Bull v. Kentucky National Bank, 90 Ky. 452; Bland v. Bland,
90 Ky. 400.
There was no attempt to exempt the fund from liability for the
improvident son's debts in the case at hand, but only to keep the principal out of his hands. Such a trust does not contravene the purpose
of the statute, and is not against public policy. Is it against public
policy to prevent the squandering of a large estate at the race-track?
The evidence showed that the son was a spender and gambler and there
was no doubt that he would waste the estate in gambling and improvidence if he had been clothed with the power to alienate it.
Nor does the consent of all parties concerned matter. All the
estate which the son has, and all the interest which the trustee holds
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are possessed by virtue of the conveying clause in the will. They cannot agree to change it. The estate which the will gives is in them.
The court stated that it could see no good reason for conveying
the property contrary to the provisions of the will and the desire of
the testator, and that it could not remake the terms creating the trust,
E. B. C.
as long as it was in other respects lawful.
CRIMINAL LAw-WrrNEsS TO BE AN Acco PLcE MUST SUSTAIN SU0n
RELATxoNsHIP TO CRimq-.AL ACT AS THAT HE COULD BE JOINMTLY INDICTED

WiTH AccusED.-Defendant was indicted jointly with three others for
the forcible breaking and entering into a store house with the felonious
intent to steal goods, wares, etc., and for stealing such goods, wares,
etc. They afterwards sold the property to an uncle of the defendant,
who, when the goods were traced to him, told from whom he bought
them. Defendant was convicted on the sole testimony of his uncle,
and appealed, contending that his uncle was an accomplice, and that
conviction could not be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless
corroborated by other evidence. The conviction was affirmed. Solomon
v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 184, 270 S. W. 780.
The Criminal Code of Practice, section 241, provides as follows, "A
conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless
corroborated by other evidence tending to connect defendant with the
commission of the offence; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it
merely shows that the offence was committed, and the circumstances
thereof."
From the above definition of an accomplice, it is evident that one,
in order to be such, must be present during the commission of the act,
not actually doing the act itself, but aiding or abetting it; or by previously knowingly assisting in the preparations for the act, or by subsequently assisting to conceal it. Here, the defendant insisted that his
uncle knowingly received the stolen goods and that that fact made him
a participant in the crime charged, and,.therefore, an accomplice. This
contention is manifestly erroneous. In the first place it was not proved
that the uncle so took the goods; but even so, in order to make one an
accomplice, it is necessary that his criminal participation in the crime
charged be shown by evidence, and he must sustain such a relation to
the criminal act that he could be jointly indicted with the accused for
its commission; and though his guilt of another crime resulting from
that charged be shown, it will not make him an accomplice of those who
were engaged in the commission of the crime charged and first committed. Richardson v. Corn., 166 Ky. 570, 179 S. W. 458; Nichofl v.
Cor., 169 Ky. 491, 184 S. W. 386; ,lmendorff v. Cor., 171 Ky. 410, 188
S. W. 483.
Assuming that the uncle knew that the goods were stolen, his
offense would be that of knowingly receiving stolen goods, and not that
of house breaking, for it is not even contended that he was on the scene
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at the time of the act, or that he aided or abetted them in any way, or
had any previous knowledge of their intention. This being the case,
his act in receiving the goods could not, by any stretch of the imagination, authorize his joint indictment with the defendant for the crime
with which the defendant was charged; and his indictment for receiving stolen goods knowingly, although it grew out of the act of the
defendant, would not have made him an accomplice. Richardson v.
Com., 166 Ky. 750; Elmendorff v. Com., 171 Ky. 410.
In view of these authorities, it Is evident that the uncle was not
an accomplice of the defendant and his confederates, so that his evidence, though uncorroborated, if strong enough, was sufficient to convict the defendant, and section 241 of the Criminal Code is inapplicable.
E. M. N.
DEATH-CONTINUANCE

OF LuE

PRESUMED

UNTIL

EXPIRATION

OF

STATUTORY SsvzN YEAR PFIoD--A was issued a life insurance policy
on May 20, 1895, by the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York.
He was then living in Louisville, Kentucky. All the premiums were
paid up to and including payment due November 20, 1913. The next
payment was due May 20, 1914. About November, 1913, A left Louisville, stating he was going to Arcadia, Florida.
December 29, 1921, A, not having returned to Kentucky since he
left in 1913, was presumed to be dead under section 1639 of Kentucky Statutes and upon application the Jefferson County Court appointed the Louisville Trust Company as his administrator. On April
19, 1922, the Louisville Trust Company, as A's administrator, began
suit to recover on the above named contract of insurance. Held: A
would be presumed as continuing to live until the full statutory period
of seven years had elapsed, unless the second presumption is overcome
by the evidence. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York v.
Louisville Trust Company, 207 Ky. 654, 269 S. W. 1014.
The common law rule is stated thus in Chapman v. Cooper, 5 Rich,
Law (S. C.) 380: "Under the common law rule of twenty years the
presumption is that the death occurred at the commencement of the
period." But, as stated in Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Martin,
108 Ky. 11, 55 S. W. 694, and in 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, section 41, the
common law rule is said to be that, "After the lapse of seven years
without intelligence concerning the person, the presumption of life
ceased, and the burden of proof devolved on the other party to show
that he was alive."
However, both in England and the United States, where there is a
statute, such as section 1639, Kentucky -Statutes, in the absence of a
person for seven years from a former place of residence without intelligence concerning him, the presumption is that he is dead at the expiration of such statutory period and only then, unless evidence is produced to the contrary. It has been so held in the following cases: In
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Re Benham's Trust, L. R., 5 Ch. App., 139; Davis v. Briggs, 97 U. S.
628; Western d Southern Life Insuiance Company v. Nagel, 180 Ky.
476, 203 S. W. 192; Bailey v. Bailey, 36 Mich. 181; and in Evans v.
IStewart, 81 Va. 724.
P.E. IL
BAE
TS-MISDELivEnY-DuTY To Rru N BAILD PSOPErT AnSoL TF.-By agreement with the governmental agents for the sale of
Liberty Bonds appellants received for delivery to appellee a number of
bonds. Delivery was to take place upon payment by appellee. Appellee complied with conditions hnd directed appellants to forward the
bonds by registered mail. Appellant misdirected the mail and the post
office to which they were sent was robbed. It was agreed that appellant and appellee stand in the relation of bailee and bailor, but appellant contends that since the bailment was gratuitous it owed the bailor
not an absolute duty to deliver, but only the duty to exercise due care
and good faith. Held, that a bailee's duty to return bailed property is
absolute. Harlan State Bank v. Banner Creek Coal Corporation, 202
Ky. 639, 261 S. W. 16.
The cases are many in support of the statement that a ballee Is
under an absolute duty to return bailed property to the bailor and that
a failure to do so amounts to conversion and renders the ballee liable.
Misdelivery, whether intentional or unintentional, as in this case, is
equivalent to a non-delivery to the proper person and is therefore conversion. Murray v. Postal Telegraph Co., 96 N. E. (Mass.) 916; Gibbons v. Farwell, 29 N. W. (Mich.) 855.
The degree of diligence which is exacted of the several classes of
bailees in respect to the care of the thing bailed, has ordinarily no application to the liability of the bailee in respect to the return or delivery and the fact that the bailment is gratuitious does not relieve the
bailee from liability for delivery to the wrong person. Serry v. Knepper, 70 N. W. (Iowa) 601; Hubbel v. Blandy, 49 N. W. (Mich.) 502.
R. P. M.
EVIDENCE-DYING DF.CLARATOios-ADm IssiBLE ONLY wHNn

DECLAB-

CH on-G-The two defendants were charged
with the murder of one H. The first, a deputy sheriff, had called upon
the second to aid him in the arrest of D, They met with resistance
and a shooting affray resulted in which H., a supporter of D., and D.,
were both fatally wounded. During the trial the Commonwealth offered in evidence the dying declaration of D. As the defendants were
being tried only for the murder of H. the court refused to admit the
statement of D. As the trial resulted in a disagreement of the jury,
the Commonwealth appealed that the law might be certified. Held,
that the court was correct in refusing to admit the declaration of D.
Commonwealth v. Smith and Davidson, 206 Ky. 709, 268 S. W. 346.
ANT'S DEATH IS SUBJECT OF
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The court follows the ruling adopted in Davi v. Commonwealthi,
95 Ky. 19, 23 S. W. 585, where it is stated that dying declarations will
be confined to those whose death is the subject of the charge. In another case the facts of which are like the present case, It was held that
even though one were killed in the same affray his testimony would not
be admitted unless his death were the subject of the charge against
the prisoner. Poteete v. State, 66 Tenn. 261. This rule is thoroughly
discussed in Phillips on Evidence, p. 233, book 1, and is followed in
Mora v. .People, 35 Pac. (Colo.) 179. In fact the language of the court
in the latter case is identical with that used in the other cases, "a
dying declaration is only admissible when the death of the declarant
is the subject of the charge of homicide on trial." 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 233, also gives this rule but in McKelvey on Evidence
(Second Ed.) section 196 p. 328, we find an exception to the statement:
"It Is not carried to the extent of shutting out the declarations of a
person killed by the same act or as a result of the same transaction
which caused the death of the person whose death is the subject of the
charge." If this rule was followed there might be some doubt as to
the admission of D's statement, for both he and H. were killed in the
same shooting affray. The case which is cited in McKelvey is that of
Rex v. Baker, 2 Moody & Robb. 53 (1837). In that case Y, unknown
to i., had placed poison in a cake baked by i. A third person became ill after eating a piece of the cake and M. ate a portion to show
that the cake was not the cause of the illness. Both the third person
and i. died as a result of eating the cake and X. was tried for the
homicide of the third person. During the trial the dying testimony
of M. was offered and received.
From these cases which have been previously cited it may be seen,
however, that this statement of icKelvey has met with little favor in
the United States. The cases, while not numerous, are positive in their
statement that such testimony will be admitted only when the declarant is the person whose death is the subject of the charge.
When we consider that dying declarations are an exception to the
"hearsay rule" of evidence it is apparent that the rule given in this
case is by far the sounder and that any extension of the doctrine as in
Rex v. Baker is not to be encouraged.
R. P. M.
CORPORATIONS-FOREIGN

CORPORATION

ENTITLED TO SUE PURCH[ASER

OR TO PROTECT ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT FILING STATEMENT REQUIRED By

STATuTE.-The Borderland Coal Sales Co. was a corporation organized
under the laws of Ohio and was the owner of and in possession of 32
mine cars situated on land owned by it in Harlan county. On September 1, 1922, a suit was filed in the Harlan circuit court by Byrd Hansley against the Can-Bit Coal Co., to which action the Borderland Coal
Sales Co. was not a party, and which resulted in judgment for Hans.
ley and in an order for the sale of the property of the Can-Bit Coal
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Co., in which order the property of the plaintiff was included by mistake. The property of the plaintiff was sold as that of the Can-Bit
Co., and was bought by the defendant in this action. The sale was
reported to the court and affirmed, and defendant was about to take
the property and dispose of it when this bill for temporary injunction
to restrain him was filed. Defendant demurred on the ground that
plaintiff had not complied with section 571 of the statutes and, therefore, could not maintain the action. Court overruled the demurrer
on the ground that a foreign corporation could sue a purchaser or protect its property within this state without having complied with the
statute. Borderland Coal Sales Co. v. Wdlker, 208 Ky. 146, 270 S. W.
717.
Section 571 provides as follows: "and it shall be unlawful for any
corporation to carry on any business in this state, until it shall have
filed in the office of the Secretary of State a statement, signed by its
president or secretary, giving the location of its office or offices in this
state, and the name or names of its agent or agents thereat upon whom
process may be served." The plaintiff had not filed such statement
and the question arose as to whether or not it could maintain this
action in the courts of Kentucky for the protection of its property without having first filed this statement.
In a number of jurisdictions, the statutes prescribing the conditions upon which a foreign corporation may do business in the state
expressly provide that such corporations may not maintain any suit
or action in the state until they have complied with the conditions,
and in some of them the non-complying corporation is also prohibited
from defending in any action. In the absence of express provisions of
this nature, however, the invalidity of a contract of a non-complying
corporation does not necessarily prevent the maintenance by the corporation in the courts of the state of an action for the protection of its
property rights, if the court can assume jurisdiction without giving
force and effect to the contract itself. 12 R. C. L. 70; Western. Electrical Co. v. Pickett, 51 Colo. 415, 118 Pa. 988; International Trust Co. v.
Leschen Rope Co., 41 Colo. 299, 92 Pa. 727.
Such is the position of the Kentucky courts. The section of the
statute above cited is silent on the matter of a foreign corporation
bringing or defending such a suit without having first filed the statement, hence, the express provision is absent and the suit may be
brought. Commonwealth v. ChattanoogaImp. & Mfg. Co., 126 Ky. 636,
104 S. W. 389, 31 Ky. L. R. 389; Ichenhauser Co. v. Landrum, 153 Ky.
320, 155 S. W. 740; Artman Lumber Co. v. Bogard, 191 Ky. 392, 230 S.
W. 953.
In Commonwealt. v. ChattanoogaImp. & Mfg. Co., supra, the court
said that the statute precluded from bringing suit only those corporations who were carrying on a business in the state. In the present Instance, the plaintiff had acquired the property by purchase and had
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never attempted to operate the mine, road, or cars in any way, or to
carry on any other business in the state. In Ichenhuser Co. v. Landrum, supra, it was held that a foreign corporation having a debt
against a resident of this state which takes a mortgage on land in this
state to secure the debt, was not carrying on business within the meaning of the statute and that company could foreclose the mortgage, although it had not filed the statement as required. In Artmwn Lumber
Co. v. Bogart, supra, the executory contracts of non-complying corporations were held voidable, but not void; but if executed, the corporation
might protect its property and rights acquired thereby.
E. M. N.
WrI.S-INsTaUiMENT PnomsnqG TO PAY DEsiGNATED PERSON A SUM
HELD TO BE A WI AND NOT A
No.--Appellant's decedent, during his lifetime, executed to appellee
the following instrument: "This the 15th day of March, 1920, payable at
my death I promise to pay William M. Sizemore the sum of $1,500.00
fifteen hundred dollars out of my estate which I have at that time."
The instrument was properly signed and witnessed. Probate was refused on the ground that the instrument was a note and not a will.
From a judgment of the trial court holding the writing to be a will,
this appeal is brought. Judgment sustained. Little's Ad'r
v. Sizemore, 208 Ky. 135, 270 S. W. 729.

CERTAIN IN MONEY ON TEsTAToR's DEAT

Any instrument executed with the formalities of a will, no matter
in what form, and not to take effect until the maker's death, if intended as a will, may be construed as testamentary and admitted to
probate, provided it is revocable at the pleasure of the maker. Webster v. Lowe, 107 Ky. 293, 53 S. W. 1030; Goad v. Lawrence, 24 Ky. L.
Rep. 632, 68 S. W. 411, Milan v. Stanley, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 783, 111 S. W.
296; Morrison v. Bartlett, 148 Ky. 833, 147 S. W. 761, 41 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 39; 3 Story 755. In order to be a will the instrument must be of a
nature that is ambulatory and revocable during the maker's lifetime.
Blacksher Co. v. Northrup, 176 Ala. 190, 57 So. 743; Bates v. Hacking,
29 R. I. 1, 68 Ati. 622; Stoelker v. Thornton, 88 Ala. 241, 6 So. 680.
However, if no binding obligation is created, and no present interest
passes, the interest is revocable, and will be deemed testamentary in
character. (Cases cited above). The present case seems to be in line
with this principle.
A note payable at the death of the maker is valid. Dorsey v. HuImon., 179 Ala. 520, 60 So. 303; Barnett v. Franklin College, 10 Ind. A.
103, 37 N. E. 427. But as between the immediate parties to a note, it
must, like other contracts, contain a valuable consideration. Boblett
v. Barlow, 26 Ky. L. 1026, 83 S. W. 145-; Roberts v. Million, 17 Ky. L.
599, 32 S. W. 220; Conrad v. Manning, 125 Mich. 77, 83 N. W. 1038.
Where an instrument contains a valuable consideration it will be held
as a note and not a testamentary paper. Price v. Jones, 145 Ind. 543,
5 N. E. 683; Hegeman v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462, 30 N. E. 487. Neither
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will a "good consideration" support such an instrument. Sullivan v.
Sullivan, 122 Ky. 707, 92 S. W. 966. Hence in the present case the instrument was not binding on the maker, as It contained no valuable
consideration, and he had the right to revoke it at any time. Such a
writing is held to be testamentary. Wels v. Lewis, 190 Ky. 626, 228
S. W. 3. In the cases of Price v. Jones, 105 Ind. 543, 5, N. E. 683, and
Hegemam v. Moon, 131 N. Y. 462, 30 N. E" 487, there were instruments
very similar to the one in question, but which contained valuable consideration; they were held to be a notes.
Where the language used in a will is reasonably susceptible of two
different constructions, one of which will defeat, and the other sustain
the provisions, the doubt is to be resolved in favor of the construction
which will give effect to the will, rather than the one which will defeat
it. In re Stickney, 85 Md. 79, 36 Atl. 654; Clark v. Mack, 161 Mich.
545, 126 N. W. 632; In re Holbrook, 213 Pa. St. 93, 62 Atl. 368.
The present case holding that an instrument promising to pay a
designated person $1,500.00 on testator's death, and one not containing
a valuable consideration, to be a will and not a note, was decided in
line with the weight of authority.
W. F. S.
CRops-ANNuAL CROPS PntsoxALTY-GRAssEs, Fnurrs AND PERENNIAL CROPS ARE CONSIDERED PART OF REALTY, BUT AwNuA-, CROPS As PERSONALTY.-Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association had 579
hogsheads of tobacco stored in their warehouse in C a fourth class
city. The officers of the city assessed this property and undertook to
collect the city taxes due thereon. An injunction was sought to prevent them from so doing. Denied-Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative Association v. City of Carrollton, 208 Ky. 270, 270 S. W. 749.
The fruit of trees, perennial bushes, and grasses growing from
perennial roots are fructus naturales. (Crops that are produced by the
powers of nature alone). Such crops are considered a part of the
realty. Sparrow v. Pona, 49 Minn. 412, 417, 52 N. W. 36. If a tenant
who holds for a certain time plants annual crops, or trees and shrubbery, in a nursery, for the purpose of transportation they are not a part
of the realty. Whitemarsh v. Walker, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 313, 4 Taunt. 316.
Judge Sherwood for the whole court in GartV v. Caldwell, 72 Mo.
622, said, "It seems quite well established now both in England and in
this country, that annual crops, crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation, are fructus industriales, are to be regarded as personal chattels, independent of and distinct from the land, capable of being sold
by oral contract and without regard to whether the crops are growing
or having matured, have ceased to draw nutriment from the soil."
The common law rule is that all those products of the earth which
are annual, and which are raised by yearly manurance and labor, and
essentially owe their annual existence to the cultivation of man, are,
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even while still annexed to the soil, treated as chattels, with the usual
Incidents thereof. Herron v. Herron, 47 Ohio St. 544, 25 N. E. 420.
11 Kerr on Real Property at page 958 says: "Where there are annual crops upon the land assigned to a widow as her dower, which were
growing at the time of her husband's death, they will belong to her,
and not to the heirs or executors of the husband."
In Preston v. Ryan , 45 Mich. 174, Justice Cooley said: "There are
numerous cases in which it has been held that where the owner of
crops has undertaken to sell the same at private sale, before they
matured, or while ripe though ungathered, such crops, if grain or other
agricultural produce raised annually, are to be treated as personalty
for the purposes of such sale."
Annual crops are not included in a judicial appraisal, and hence
to include them in the sale would be to give to the purchaser property which had not been subject to appraisal; the debtors rights can
only be protected by regarding the annual crops as personalty requiring a separate levy. Cassi~y v. R1hodes, 12 Ohio 96.
R. C. S.
MUNOIC1PAT CORPORATIONS-SERvANT SUING FOR I JURIES MUST AL.
LEGE CITY wAs NOT PERFORMNG GoVEyNamE.&i FuxoTiom.-Plaintiff
was employed by a city as a truck driver. He alleges that while he
was standing upon the rear end of the platform, and in the discharging of his duty that the bolt holding the dumping apparatus gave way
and caused the load of water pipes to fall upon him. Plaintiff claims
that it was negligence for the city to allow Its truck to become defective and worn. The jury gave six thousand dollars damages, and from
this judgment the city has appealed, claiming first that the court erred
in overruling its demurrer; second, that incompetent evidence was
introduced at the trial over its objections, to which it excepted. The
upper court reversed the judgment, with directions to sustain the motion for a new trial. City of Bowling Green v. Bandy, 208 Ky. 259, 270
S. W. 837.
A municipal corporation, in the preservation of peace, public
health, maintenance of good order, and the enforcement of the law for
the safety of the public, possesses governmental functions and repre.
sents the state. If a plaintiff can show that its case does not come
under any of these, or if he can show that the thing being done Is
peculiarly for the benefit of the corporation he can recover for injuries, or his administrator for his death. Smith's Administrator v.
Commissioner of Sewerage of LouisviZle, 146 Ky. 562, 143 S. W. 3.
If a servant is Injured he must show that the city was not performing a governmental function, for unless he does do this no liability
accrues, and the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable.
Cowefl v. Waterbury, 74 Conn. 568, 51 Atl. 530.
If a servant is performing some task that comes within the gov.
ernmental function class, he is acting thus as a mere governmental
L. J.-6
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agency, although the city pays for his services, and the relation between him and the city is not the ordinary one of master and servant.
JTewett v. City of New Haven, 38 Conn. 368, 9 A. Rep. 382.
The case of Pettingll v. City of (JheZsea, 161 'Mass. 368, 37 N. E.
38, seems to be in point. In that case the court held that a city is not
liable to one employed by it as a lineman, on its fire signal, though
the breaking of a line was due to the negligence of the city. The general doctrine is that no private action, unless authorized, by express
statute, can be maintained against a city for the neglect of the public
duty imposed upon It by law, for tMe benefit of the public and from
the performance of which the corporation receives no profit or advantage. HUiZ v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332.
The plaintiff must allege some act or default by those for whom
the corporation must respond, under the well established principle of
respondeat supeilor. The rule Is especially applicable to a municipal
corporation. Tomlin v. Hildreth, 65 N. J. L. 438, 47 Atl. 649.
R. C. S.
DAmAGFs-ADVANCE NoT-cE or FAoTs IS NECESSARY TO REcovEny or
ANTICIATED :PoFirs.-Plaintiff, a manufacturer and wholesale dealer
in ladies' suits and cloaks, delivered to the agent of the defendant company in Louisville on June 11, 1920, a shipment of samples to plain
tiff's agent W. at Indianapolis. The package should have reached W.
the next morning. For some unexplainable reason the shipment did
not reach the defendant's office in Indianapolis until some five or six
days later. In the meantime W. inquired as to its arrival and, after
having not received it at the expiration of three days left Indianapolis.
After some correspondence as to the disposition of the package it was
returned to the plaintiff at Louisville but neither he nor W. would receive it.
The following December this action was brought to.recover damages for the delay in delivery and in the amended petition it was alleged that the package contained nine models of ladies' clothes to be
used by W. in canvassing orders for the plaintiff, that defendant's
agent was notified at the time that the package contained samples to
be used by W. the week of June 12, that the intrinsic value of the con.
tents was $152.50 but that It had cost plaintiff 652.50 and would have
been worth that much, to him if in his possession during the selling
season, He further alleged that if the models had arrived in IndianapoliA that W. could and would have sold goods to the aggregate of
;6,000.00 upon which the plaintiff would have netted 15 per cent or
but confined the amount to $652.50 the cost of the models. The jury
$900.00
He asked for this amount in addition to the direct damages
found for the plaintiff the full amount asked for, $652.50.
On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower
court on the grounds that the damage was not of such a nature as
to be computable nor was notice given as to the probable loss that
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would result if the shipment were lost. American Railway EZpress
Co. v. Steinberg, 208 Ky. 251, 270 S. W. 765.
The court In hdnding down this decision followed the general rule
of the courts of most of the states. The great weight of authority is
that where there are peculiar circumstances which might tend to increase the damage, notice must be given of those circumstances before
one can claim damages for a loss of anticipated profits. There must
be in addition to notice of danger of additional loss a reasonable basis
of computation of the loss sustained. It is upon these two grounds
that the courts lay down the principle followed in the above named
case.
The California court in CaliforniaPress Mfg. Co. v. Stafford Packing Co., 221 Pac. 345, said, "Damages for the loss of anticipated profits,
which can be said to have been reasonably within the contemplation
of the parties are not recoverable." The same court in Stephany v.
Hunt, 217 Pac. 797, said, "In order to sustain a recovery of anticipated
profits, there must be a reasonably certain basis for their ascertainment
and it must be shown that they were reasonably certain to have been
realized but for the wrongful act complained of." The Oklahoma court
holds, "Estimated direct profits which must have been in the contemplation of the parties may be recovered," Ash v. Gas Company,, 223 Pac.
175. The Nebraska court also says, "Gains prevented as loss sustained
may be recovered as damages, but it must appear that profits were
reasonably certain to be realized and that such damages were within
the contemplation of the parties." O'Shea v. North American Hotel
Co., 191 N. W. 321. The Texas court in the case of Wichita Falls Electric Co. v. Huey, 246 S. W. 692, says, "Recovery for profits or gains
prevented may be had, provided it was in contemplation of the parties
at the time the contract was made that such damages would naturally
follow its breach."
The Kentucky court adheres to the general rule and has said in
Blood v. Herring, 61 S. W. 273, "Estimated direct profits which must
have been in the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract
was made may be recovered as damages." Then again in MossJellico
(oal Co. v. American Railway Express Co., 198 Ky. 202, "To make
notice of special circumstances sufficient to authorize recovery from a
carrier for special damages there must be imparted to him such facts
as will bring home to him the peculiar facts and conditions known to
the shipper which will entail a loss on the carrier not ordinarily within
W. B.
the contemplation of the parties if the shipment is lost."
LIBEL AND SL&NDE -NEwsPAPERS NOT H
CoNsTrrUTEs CoMPLETE DEsENSe, THOUGH
MAxc&.-Appellant, an attorney, was sued
perform his agreed duties in regard to the
the negligence his client suffered loss and
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$123.00 damages. The appellee newspaper in reporting the suit published the following statement: "Mrs. G. sought to recover $123.00
which she declares she paid P. to look after legal matters for her." In
truth the fee was only $10.00 and the additional damage was caused
by the attorney's negligence.
In a suit of the attorney against the newspaper the court held that
newspapers are not under the law held to the exact facts nor to the
most minute details of the facts they publish. The law requires only
that what they publish shall be substantially true and as there was
substantial truth in the statements of the appellee and only a mistake
in the amount of the fee, the judgment for the defendant is affirmed.
Plumber v. Commercial Tribune Pub. Go., 208 Ky. 210, 270 S. W. 793.
The courts of the different states seem to be unanimous in adhering to the rule that truth, in the absence of malice, constitutes a defence to an action for libel, Lunn v. Webster, 260 S. W. 157. There
is a difference, however, when malice is shown. In Kirkpatrick v.
Journal Publishing Co., 97 So. 58, the Alabama court laid down the rule
that truth is a complete defence irrespective of malice. This doctrine
Is also followed in New York, Indiana, and Oregon. Huff v. Bennett, 6
N. Y. Super. Ct. 120; Hillman v. Shanklin, 60 Ind. 424; fhartle v.-Hutch.
inson, 3 Ore. 337. Massachusetts, Delaware, and Louisiana, under statutory change, do not go so far but hold that truth constitutes a defense
when no malice is shown on the part of the libellant. Perry v. Porter,
124 Mass. 338; Delaware State Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Croasdale, 6 Houst. 181.
The Kentucky courts have seemingly gone farther than either of
these doctrines and have laid down the principle that a substantial
truth is a complete defense irrespective of malice: Rollins v. Louisville
Times Pub. Co., 90 S. W. 1081, 139 Ky. 788;CourierJournal Co. v. Phillips, 134 S. W. 466, 142 Ky. 372; Radcliffe v. Louisville Courier.ournal,
99 Ky. 416, 36 S. W. 177. Alabama also follows the Kentucky rule and
says, "A plea that'the alleged libelous statement was substantially true
is sufficient." Kirkpatrick v. Journal Publishing Co., 97 So. 58.
Thd court of Iowa was more definite in Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.
W. 167, and said, "In a libel suit, a plea of justification need not be in
the exadt form of the charge but must be as broad as the charge. The
substantial truth of the allegation is a sufficient defence."
W. B.
SEARCHES AND SEIzuREs-SEIzuRE OF LIQUOR FOUND ON SEARCH MADE
wITH DEFENDANT'S CONSENT HELD NOT UNLAwFL.-The defendant was

convicted of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquors and appealed
upon the ground that the evidence for the Commonwealth was incompetent; It not having been obtained by aid of a search warrant. A
citizen passing by the defendant's automobile which was parked In
front of a pool room discovered strong odors of liquor emanating from
the automobile. He informed the chief of police and that officer also
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detected the unmistakable odor of whiskey from the same source. When
the defendant returned to his automobile he confessed that there was
liquor in the car and consented to the search before an arrest was
made. Held, that the evidence of search was admissible, because by
the consent of the accused to the search a warrant was unnecessary.
Judgment affirmed. Brown v. Common~beath, 208 Ky. 345, 270 S. W.
833.
It is an exception to the general rule that a search without a warrant is unlawful where the consent or permission of the one in possession Is given for that purpose. This is illustrated by the case of Banks
v. Oommonwealth, 190 Ky. 330, wherein it was held that the general
rule does not apply to a search of one's premises, though without a warrant, if done with the consent of the person in rightful possession of
the place searched. In McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 203 Ky. 239, 270
S. W. 832, it was held that a conductor's permission to officers to search
a caboose in which the accused brakeman slept was sufficient to justify
them in making a search without a warrant. This seems to be a recognized exception in Kentucky according to the following cases: Smith
v. Uommonwealth, 197 Ky. 192, 246 S. W. 449; Patterson v. Uommonwealth, 206 Ky. 258, 267 S. W. 160; Gray v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky.
663, 249 S. W. 769
The same exception to the general rule is recognized In the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. But in every case the officer acting
without warrant must do so with the consent or by the invitation of
the owner, voluntarily given. In the case of Halata v. United States,
268 Fed. 125, the defendant allowed the search because he believed the
officer had a warrant lawfully issued. Although consent was given for
the search to be made, it was not voluntarily given and this of course
did not waive the defendant's constitutional right. The cases of Dillon
v. United States, 279 Fed. 639, and United States v. Slusser, 270 Fed.
818, also support the exception to the general rule that a search without warrant is not unlawful where consent was voluntarily given by
the person in possession.
A.H. T.

